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ASSERTION AND THE VARIETIES OF 
NORMS1
abstract
This paper challenges Cappelen’s claim that the speech act category of assertion is to be discarded since 
there is no principled way to distinguish between utterances that are assertions and those that are 
not. Using an Austin-inspired framework, I will argue that, in opposition to his claim, there are some 
norms that can be seen to apply to assertion in a more intimate way than others, and these norms can 
be shown to be constitutive of it, since it is by means of them that we can account for specific defects 
pertaining to the making of an assertion, which the reliance on contextually variable norms (such as the 
conversational maxims of Grice to which he refers) does not seem able to do.
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This paper challenges Herman Cappelen’s claim that the speech act category of assertion,1 
as characterized in the contemporary philosophical debate, is an empty category with 
no explanatory power, due to the fact that any attempt to identify a principled way to 
distinguish between those utterances that are assertions and those that are not is bound to 
fail (Cappelen, 2011). In particular, I intend to focus specifically on two of the arguments he 
provides against the most prominent theories of assertion, namely normative ones.2 These 
arguments do indeed raise an interesting question about the ways in which normative theories 
deal with norms that are supposed to govern assertion essentially and how they relate to 
those governing assertion in a more extrinsic way, as conversational maxims do. My aim will 
be to show that, insofar as we want to defend the speech act category of assertion against 
arguments such as those proposed by Cappelen, we have to clarify the roles that different 
kinds of norms play in the making of assertions, and I shall argue that this can be done within 
an Austin-inspired framework for speech act analysis (see Sbisà, 2017).
In the last twenty years or so, there has been considerable debate over the nature of assertion 
among those who work in the philosophy of language and other related fields of research, such 
as epistemology.3 At the core of this debate is Timothy Williamson’s claim that the members of 
the speech act category of assertion are those speech acts whose performance is governed by 
the knowledge norm (henceforth KNA), which he articulates in the following way:4
(KNA) One must: assert p only if one knows p (Williamson, 2000, p. 243).
1  I would like to thank the editors of this special issue of Phenomenology and Mind for their support and patience, and 
also an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions. 
2  Cappelen (2011, pp. 30-37) provides four arguments against normative theories that take assertion to be governed 
by a constitutive rule. For a detailed, critical examination of these arguments, see Montgomery (2014).
3  As pointed out by a referee, the term ‘assertion’ has often been used ambiguously in this debate to refer either 
to all those utterances of indicative sentences involving the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition 
expressed, which Mitchell Green (2013) has grouped together under the label “the assertive family”, or just to 
assertion proper. Here, when speaking of the nature of assertion, I am referring to what it is that qualifies a speech act 
to be an assertion proper. Later on, I will widen the discussion to other members of the assertive family, arguing that 
Cappelen’s view cannot account for the differences among these types of act.
4  (KNA) has been defended, though on different grounds, by Keith DeRose (2002), John Hawthorne (2004), and John 
Turri (2011), among others.
1. Introduction
2. The Debate 
Over the Nature of 
Assertion
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According to Williamson (2000), (KNA) gives the condition “on which a speaker has the 
authority to make an assertion. Thus asserting p without knowing p is doing something 
without having the authority to do it, like giving someone a command without having the 
authority to do so” (p. 257). On this ground, (KNA) is conceived as constitutive of the speech 
act of assertion, that is, it is essential to this act, governing necessarily every instance of it. 
According to Williamson, indeed, (KNA) specifies a necessary condition for properly asserting. 
It is worth noting that, although (KNA) governs every instance of the speech act of assertion, 
when one violates it, one is still making an assertion, even if this assertion is improper and 
so may be subject to criticism from its audience. Moreover, there are some cases in which, 
for example, due to the urgency of the situation, one can legitimately assert that p, even if 
one knows that one does not know p. In these cases, Williamson (2000) holds, (KNA) “can be 
overridden by other norms not specific to assertion” (p. 256), making one’s assertion that p 
permissible.
Among those who support the constitutivity claim, but do not think that knowledge is the 
norm of assertion, there is wide disagreement about how the norm of assertion is to be 
characterized. Some hold that truth is the norm of assertion (Weiner, 2005), while others 
claim that it is governed by a norm of belief (Bach, 2008), others again conceive the norm 
of assertion as involving epistemic requirements other than knowledge, such as justified 
or rational belief (see, respectively, Kvanvig, 2009; and Douven, 2006), or that it is credible 
or reasonable for the speaker to believe the asserted content (Lackey, 2007), and the like. 
There are also those, such as Goldberg (2015), who argue that the norm of assertion is 
context-sensitive.5
Herman Cappelen (2011) has recently entered the debate over the nature of assertion, 
arguing in favor of what he calls “the No-assertion view”, according to which the speech act 
of assertion can be discarded since it can be shown to be a theoretically useless category, at 
least as characterized by the most prominent theories of assertion, particularly the normative 
ones. According to him, all that we need to account for those utterances that philosophers 
traditionally place under this category is the notion of “saying”, which refers here to the 
act of expressing a (complete) proposition by means of uttering a declarative sentence, 
together with some contextually variable norms (Cappelen, 2011, pp. 22-26). According to 
this view, “declarative” sayings are governed by norms that, since they vary across contexts, 
cannot be constitutive of the act of saying. Cappelen takes Grice’s conversational maxims as 
a paradigmatic case of these norms because they “are norms that guide behavior, not norms 
that are essential to (or constitutive of) the behavior they guide” (Cappelen, 2011, p. 24). More 
specifically, since norms like these guide speech behavior, rather than being constitutive of it 
or of the conversational exchanges in which it is involved, they can never be stably associated 
with a certain context. Accordingly, given the contextually salient features of the situation, 
sayings may be evaluated by appealing to various norms, such as moral norms, norms of 
politeness, norms involved in communicative cooperation and so on.
While both Pro-assertion views (like those presented in the previous section) and Cappelen’s 
No-assertion view concur that in uttering a declarative sentence one expresses a (complete) 
proposition, whatever it may be, what is at issue, in Cappelen’s opinion, is the essentialist 
claim supported by normative theories of assertion, according to which an utterance counts as 
an assertion in virtue of its being governed by some norm. Accordingly, Cappelen holds that, 
insofar as the essentialist claim is shown to be false (regardless of its content), the No-assertion 
5  For an overview of the main theories involved in the debate over the nature of assertion, see Pagin (2007/2014). 
3. Cappelen’s No-
Assertion View
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view should be preferred to its main opponents. To this end, he gives four arguments, of 
which the first two support norm variability, while the other two regard our ordinary ways of 
speaking of unwarranted or insincere assertions and of reporting one’s assertion, respectively. 
As mentioned in Section 1, I shall focus here on the first two arguments, since they purport to 
show that normative theories cannot account for the data supporting norm variability. Here I 
shall simply present the two arguments, while in Section 4.2 I shall proceed to discuss them in 
the light of the Austin-inspired framework.
The first argument is concerned with modal judgments about norm variability (Cappelen, 
2011, pp. 30-32). Cappelen points out that, although Williamson (together with many other 
proponents of the norm of assertion) argues in favor of an essentialist claim about the norm 
governing the speech act of assertion, he provides no modal argument in its support, but 
merely aims to show that when making assertions, people actually conform to (KNA). Is 
Williamson justified in claiming that (KNA) necessarily governs every instance of assertion? 
If so, it would be impossible to conceive of assertion “as governed by a variety of norms” 
(Cappelen, 2011, p. 31). But according to Cappelen, this is easily conceivable. Think of Mia 
performing, by saying that p, a certain act E, corresponding to what the proponents of 
normative theories would take to be a paradigmatic case of assertion, and then ask yourself:
Could Mia have done that, i.e. performed E, if the default assumption was that she only 
assert that p if she believes that p?
Could Mia have done that, i.e. performed E, if the default assumption was that she 
assert p only if she is committed to defending p in response to objections?
Could she have done that, i.e. performed E, if the default assumption was that she only 
assert p if p is true? (Cappelen, 2011, p. 31).
According to Cappelen, while proponents of normative theories, such as Williamson, would 
say that only in one case has Mia performed E, that is, in the situation in which the default 
assumption corresponds to their favored norm, in his view we can feel justified in holding that 
she has performed the act E in every one of these cases.6 Consider now a case in which a game, 
that is, a paradigmatic case of a rule-governed activity, is involved:
Could [Mia] have played that game, i.e. tennis, if serves were thrown by hand, without 
a racket, and no ball could be hit by a player unless she had a foot on one of the lines …. 
(fill out for completeness)? (Cappelen, 2011, p. 31).
According to Cappelen, it would be hard to hold that in this case she would be playing the same 
game. In his view, a comparison between the two cases makes it clear that “assertion is not 
like a game, and that it’s not governed by rules” (Cappelen, 2011, pp. 31-32). If so, (KNA), or any 
other norm of assertion, cannot be conceived as constitutive of it, as there is no rule necessarily 
governing it. Accordingly, the proponents of assertion’s norm have no principled way to 
distinguish between those sayings that they suppose to be assertions and those that are not.
The second argument focuses on the actual variability of the norms involved in the making 
of an assertion (Cappelen, 2011, pp. 32-35). In Cappelen’s view, if it can be shown that such 
6  One reviewer has pointed out that here Cappelen is misrepresenting the point of view of normative theorists. 
Be that as it may, my focus will not be on Cappelen’s reconstruction of their point of view, but on his claim (to be 
discussed below in Section 4.2) that regardless of what norm is in force, one can recognize that by saying p Mia has 
performed an act E corresponding to what normative theorists would take to be an assertion.
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a variability actually exists, then those “declarative” sayings that are taken to be assertions 
cannot be said to be governed necessarily by some norm. Here, Cappelen is referring to 
the discussions among the proponents of the norm of assertion. As in any philosophical 
debate, when someone argues for a certain norm of assertion, someone else provides one 
or more cases that are presented as going against the view that such a norm governs every 
instance of that speech act and is thereby constitutive of it. In response to these cases, the 
proponent of the norm will present some defensive maneuvers to account for them, holding, 
for example, that “the case in question wasn’t really an assertion, or it wasn’t performed 
in a default context, or it has some kind of second order justification that blinds us to the 
first order violation” (Cappelen, 2011, p. 33). What matters here is that the wide variety 
of counterexamples presented in the debate over the content of norm’s assertion provide 
overwhelming evidence that the same instance of assertion can be legitimately accounted for 
by appealing to one norm rather than another. According to Cappelen, this overwhelming 
evidence suggests that it is impossible to identify one single norm governing all cases of 
assertion.7
In this section, I will argue that, in opposition to Cappelen’s No-Assertion view, there is no 
need to discard the speech act category of assertion and replace it with a “minimalist” account 
centered on the notion of saying. On the one hand, Cappelen’s proposal can be shown to be 
unsatisfactory. Indeed, he gives too much weight to norms such as Grice’s conversational 
maxims, holding that we can explain what people do in conversation and how they do that by 
appealing solely to those norms, but this appears to be debatable (Section 4.1). On the other 
hand, if we want to defend the speech act category of assertion against arguments such as 
those presented above, one promising route to follow could be that of referring to the Austin-
inspired framework recently developed by Marina Sbisà (2017) to account for “the different 
roles [speech act norms] play in the dynamics of illocution” (p. 1).8 On the basis of this 
framework, we can shed light on the relationship between norms which need to be observed 
in the making of an assertion and norms governing assertion in a more extrinsic way, as 
conversational maxims do (Section 4.2).
As seen above, according to Cappelen’s No-assertion view, in uttering a declarative sentence 
one performs a saying, expressing a certain proposition. But, and this is fundamental to his 
“minimalist” account, there is no rule governing a saying: for this reason, sayings can be 
assessed in a variety of ways, depending on the contextually salient features of the situation. 
However, in accounting for controversial cases in which putative assertions are involved, the 
norms referred to by Cappelen are almost always Grice’s conversational maxims, regarded by 
him as the paradigmatic case of norms which, while operating on sayings, are not constitutive 
of the acts being performed. Consider the case of the conjunction of the form “p, but I don’t 
know that p”, whose apparent wrongness is usually provided as evidence in support of (KNA) 
(see, e.g., Williamson, 2000, pp. 253-254). Cappelen (2011, pp. 37-40) points out that, insofar as 
its wrongness is assumed to support a constitutive rule of that kind, the same could be said 
of many other similar sentences. Consider the following two examples taken from a list of 
sentences proposed by him: 
7  Even if it could be argued that Cappelen’s conclusion is a non-sequitur (as a reviewer has rightly observed), I will 
challenge his argument from another point of view (see Section 4.2).
8  The page numbers of the quotations refer to the preprint version of Sbisà’s paper available on her ResearchGate 
page (see References). The paper is in press and forthcoming in a theme issue of the Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the 
Sciences and the Humanities.
4. How Do 
Norms Relate to 
Assertion?
4.1. Sayings 
and Grice’s 
Conversational 
Maxims
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(1) p, but I don’t want you to believe that p
(2) p, but p is irrelevant to what we are talking about.
If we follow Williamson’s line of argument, says Cappelen, each one of these sentences would 
provide evidence for a different constitutive norm of assertion, but this would be in stark 
contrast with the essentialist claim supported by normative theories of assertion. Moreover, 
Cappelen (2011) maintains that “the feelings of badness triggered by these conjunctions are 
easily explained by standard Gricean considerations” (p. 38). According to him, if a speaker 
uttered (2), she would directly violate the maxim of relevance, since, while presenting herself 
as conforming to it in the first conjunct (“p”), she would then be denying it in the second one 
(“but p is irrelevant to what we are talking about”). The same can be said of “p, but I don’t 
know that p”, except for the fact that here the speaker would be violating the maxim of quality 
(see Cappelen, 2011, p. 39). However, it seems to me that reliance on Grice’s conversational 
maxims is not enough to account for the defects of speech behavior corresponding to the 
utterance of sentences such as those presented above. Note that already Austin (1975) pointed 
out that “in order to explain what can go wrong with statements we cannot just concentrate 
on the proposition involved” (p. 52), since what is required is a reference to the total 
situation in which they are made: however, he was referring not only to aspects external to 
the performed act, as Cappelen does by appealing to Grice’s conversational maxims, but also 
to those aspects that make it possible. If both these kinds of aspects are taken into account, 
(1) and (2) can be shown to be radically different from “p, but I don’t know that p” because, 
while in the latter p turns out to be infelicitous, in the former p merely appears to be put 
forward in an awkward or unusual way. Indeed, we can easily conceive of conversational 
patterns involving (1) and (2), but that would be very difficult in the case of “p, but I don’t 
know that p”. If during a conversation a speaker utters the sentence “The red pen is on the 
table”, and then adds “...but what I have just said is irrelevant to what we are talking about”, 
she appears only to be making explicit that what she has said is not relevant to the purposes 
of the conversation, but in so doing she does not seem to be questioning any aspect that is 
characteristic of the practice of asserting. Although more complex, something similar can be 
said as regards (1). There can be many reasons why a speaker, after making the assertion that 
p, might point out that she does not want the hearer to believe that p, but that does not mean 
that the utterance of p would result in an infelicitous assertion; it may instead count as an 
assertion followed by a warning (“I warn you that I don’t want you to believe that p”). Note, 
inter alia, that uttering (1), as well as (2), can stimulate the hearer’s interest in p: there would 
be nothing wrong if she were to challenge the speaker by asking “How do you know that p?”, 
even if p is not relevant to the discussion, or the speaker does not wish the hearer to believe 
that p, respectively. However, if we focus on the second conjunct of both (1) and (2), a standard 
reaction to their being uttered may be a request for clarification, due to the fact that, as said 
above, their conjunction with p makes the utterance of the latter seem unusual or awkward. 
Indeed, the request for clarification will be not concerned with the act of asserting itself, but 
with the apparently inappropriate contribution the speaker has given to the conversation by 
uttering those sentences. For example, when a sentence such as (2) is uttered, a hearer could 
ask the speaker “So, why did you say that?”: note that this is not a challenge to her asserting 
that p, but rather a request to explain why she has given this “unusual” conversational 
contribution. If, instead, a speaker asserts only that p, and p is irrelevant to the goal of 
conversation, she may be liable to criticism for violating the maxim of relevance (“Hey, what 
you have just said is not relevant to what we are talking about!”), and the criticism can be then 
followed, if necessary, by a request for clarification (“So, what do you mean by saying that 
p?”). Very different is the case of “p, but I don’t know that p”. When a sentence such as this is 
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uttered, it looks as though something has gone wrong with what the first conjunct is designed 
to accomplish, which, insofar as this is an act of assertion, goes beyond the plain expression 
of a proposition. In particular, it is not only conversationally inappropriate to utter the two 
conjuncts together, but it looks as if uttering the second conjunct in some way questions 
what the speaker has done in uttering the first one. Indeed, if the speaker maintains that she 
does not know that p, how could she seriously assert that p? She could have made many other 
moves: for example, she could have made an assertive speech act not involving any claim 
to knowledge, such as a conjecture or a guess or the utterance of a hedged sentence, e.g. “I 
think that p” or “It may be that p”. Regardless of the precise content of the norm of assertion, 
the second conjunct appears to question something that is at the very core of the practice of 
assertion. It seems to me, then, that contrary to Cappelen’s view, making reference to Grice’s 
maxims is not enough to account for this case: while uttering a sentence such as “p, but I don’t 
know that p” involves a specific defect that in some way questions the act the first conjunct 
is designed to accomplish, that is, an assertion that p, (1) and (2) exhibit generic defects 
that have no impact on the act being performed by the utterance of the first conjunct. In a 
conversation, any linguistic move gives rise to certain expectations between the interlocutors, 
which are unrelated to the common goal of that conversation and so cannot be reduced to 
expectations of cooperativeness. If I choose to make an assertion, rather than a guess, and 
thereby utter a declarative sentence, my audience will form some expectations, which differ 
in some way from those raised by uttering “I guess that...”, regardless of the goal(s) of the 
conversation in which I am involved. But the differences among these types of act do not 
seem to be accountable within Cappelen’s framework because according to it, there cannot be 
rules that are constitutive of one or another assertive speech act. Moreover, the evaluation 
of speech behavior as appropriate or inappropriate to the goal of the conversation, as polite 
or impolite etc. also depends (in part) on it being recognized as a certain kind of illocutionary 
act. In Cappelen’s framework, there is no need for the hearer to recognize the utterance of a 
declarative sentence as being an assertion: it is enough to recover the proposition expressed 
and evaluate this saying against the norms one assumes to be the most relevant, given the 
contextually salient features of the situation. But as I have tried to show, whether a declarative 
sentence is used to do something is dependent on more than just what the speaker says by 
means of uttering it, and this “more” (whatever it may be) cannot be explained merely by 
appealing to some contextually variable norms that are external to the act being performed.
In order to defend the speech act category of assertion, it is not enough simply to question 
Cappelen’s “minimalist” account. Two more issues still need to be addressed. On the one 
hand, we have to clarify the different functions served by those norms which are (or may be) 
involved in the making of an assertion. On the other hand, insofar as we want to show that 
there is a principled way to distinguish between those utterances that are assertions and those 
that are not, and that this can be characterized in normative terms, we also have to show 
why Cappelen’s arguments should be rejected. To tackle these issues, I will rely on an Austin-
inspired framework for speech act analysis, focusing on what Marina Sbisà calls “the dynamics 
of illocution”, by which she refers to “the interactional mechanisms that make it possible for 
the utterance of one interlocutor to bring about an illocutionary effect, recognized by the 
other interlocutor” (Sbisà, 2017, p. 1).
Let us first consider Cappelen’s argument for the actual variability of norms. In support of 
his claim, Cappelen offers a lengthy quote from an article by Janet Levin (2008), in which 
she argues that there is no single norm of assertion, but many norms that “are always 
pragmatically determined” (Levin, 2008, p. 371). Indeed, in her view, there are so many reasons 
why we can make assertions which, while not conforming to (KNA), can be legitimately 
4.2. Assertion and 
the Dynamics of 
Illocution
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regarded as normatively appropriate, that (KNA) itself could be conceived as one among the 
many norms locally governing assertion. Levin (2008) points out that an assertion can be 
made, among other things, “to establish authority, to demonstrate conviction, to encourage 
others to believe, to commit themselves publicly to a belief about which they themselves had 
been (perhaps irrationally) wavering” (p. 367). This leads her to conclude that when one makes 
an assertion, e.g., to demonstrate conviction, one’s audience understands that the assertion 
is being made for that reason, regardless of whether (KNA) has been respected or not, and 
that the same can be said for many other cases. Williamson might observe here that Levin’s 
examples correspond to non-default uses of declarative sentences. However, it is far from 
clear how to distinguish between default and non-default uses. A more viable reply can be 
found in the light of the Austin-inspired framework mentioned above. Indeed, the dynamics 
of illocution is centered on the bringing about of illocutionary effects, while Levin’s examples 
include consequential effects pertaining to the perlocutionary dimension of speech acts. Here 
I am relying on the received distinction between illocutions and perlocutions: illocutions 
are the kinds of acts done in saying something according to a procedure designed to have 
characteristic effects (Austin, 1975, p. 14), while perlocutions are the kinds of acts done by 
saying something amounting to the production of consequential effects (Austin, 1975, p. 101). 
For example, by means of asserting that p, I can convince the audience to believe that p or 
that I am very competent with regard to the subject matter of p. But the assertion being made 
in no way depends on the reasons for making it. The fact that an assertion has been made, 
as well as the conditions upon which its performance is dependent, differ in important ways 
from the reasons why one has made that assertion. There is thus a sharp distinction between 
the illocutionary and perlocutionary dimension of a speech act. Note that, in challenging 
Cappelen’s argument about the actual variability of norms, I have also delimited the field of 
illocutionary act dynamics, since strictly speaking, the reasons why one makes an assertion 
cannot be conceived as part of that dynamics.
Let us now turn, firstly, to the functions served by the norms that are (or may be) involved in 
the making of an assertion, and secondly, once this point is clarified, to Cappelen’s argument 
concerning modal judgments about norm variability. With reference to the dynamics of 
illocution, Sbisà (2017) distinguishes between three different kinds of norms: constitutive 
rules, maxims, and objective requirements. Here I will focus exclusively on the first two kinds 
of speech act norms, since they are more relevant to the issues raised by Cappelen. As to 
constitutive rules, Sbisà (2017) takes them to be those norms that “when complied with, enable 
us to perform the acts they define” (p. 1). In other words, success in the performance of an 
illocutionary act is dependent upon compliance with those norms. Contrary to appearances, 
Sbisà’s constitutive rules cannot easily be equated with those proposed by the supporters of 
mainstream normative theories. Indeed, while Williamson (2000, p. 239) holds that, insofar 
as (KNA) necessarily governs any instance of assertion, it cannot be conventional because it 
is neither contingent nor replaceable, according to Sbisà (2017), there are good reasons to 
regard constitutive rules as socially accepted norms, fixing “procedures or routines that are 
repeatable and recognizable from one occasion to another and whose function (the production 
of illocutionary effects) is only exercised against a background of intersubjective agreement” 
(p. 1; see also Witek, 2015). Accordingly, within this framework, any illocutionary act, be it an 
assertion or not, can be described as the execution of a procedure fixed by socially accepted 
norms which is designed to produce a conventional effect; its achievement depends on the 
interlocutors’ intersubjective agreement, be this explicit or tacit (Sbisà, 2007; 2009). The 
reference to tacit agreement is due to the fact that a hearer does not usually check whether 
the speaker’s utterance complies with constitutive rules; instead, compliance is presumed by 
default, unless there are specific reasons for doubting it. For example, a speaker who utters 
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a simple declarative sentence, unless special conditions obtain, will be expected to be in a 
position to successfully make an assertion by means of it,9 since she has used a linguistic 
form that makes the act she purports to perform recognizable. Within this framework, then, 
constitutive rules specify the initial conditions (as well as the appropriate steps) required 
to execute the procedure successfully: failure to comply with them leads “to failure in 
performing the act and therefore in bringing about its illocutionary effect” (Sbisà, 2017, p. 15). 
In the case of assertion, beyond requiring the utterance of a declarative sentence, constitutive 
rules fix the epistemic position that is required of a speaker for asserting successfully (i.e., 
the speaker’s epistemic authority with respect to the content she purports to assert) and the 
circumstances in which the procedure for asserting can be invoked (see Labinaz and Sbisà, 
2014).10 As said above, if special conditions do not obtain, compliance with constitutive rules is 
presumed by default: the speaker and her audience are entitled to form certain expectations 
of each another connected with the correct execution of the procedure for asserting, which 
differ, for example, from the expectations raised by the correct execution of the procedure 
for performing other kinds of assertive speech acts (e.g., a guess or a conjecture). When an 
assertion is performed successfully, the bringing about of its illocutionary effect, which can be 
characterized in terms of commitments and entitlements, is also expected to be obtained. 
Now consider once more “p, but I don’t know that p”. In the light of our Austin-inspired 
framework, we can say that, insofar as it states that a constitutive rule of the act of asserting 
is violated, the utterance of the second conjunct impedes the generation of the commitments 
and entitlements that a speaker and her audience would expect of one another when a 
(successful) assertion is made. What happens then is that it is not clear what the speaker has 
done in uttering that sentence. On the one hand, one could suppose that the speaker has 
intentionally made an unsuccessful assertion, pointing out her lack of relevant knowledge 
for some particular reason (as observed in the previous section, it is very difficult to conceive 
of a conversational pattern involving the utterance of “p, but I don’t know that p”). The 
reason why she has made this unsuccessful assertion might be explained in terms of intended 
perlocutionary effects. On the other hand, in uttering that sentence, a speaker could be 
regarded (in a more charitable way) as executing the procedure for performing another kind 
of assertive speech act, such as a conjecture, whose successful performance does not require 
the speaker being in the same epistemic position as appropriate for assertion. Something 
different happens when a violation of a conversational maxim, even a non-repairable one, 
is discovered. In these cases, there is a penalty for the speaker, which consists of criticism, 
damage to reputation, or loss of reliability, but which in no way questions the achievement 
of the conventional effect characteristic of assertion. As noted by Sbisà (2017, p. 4), “[t]his 
does not make sense with conversations, since there is no single conventional effect to be 
associated with conversation as such”.11 Speaking of conversation brings us to the second 
kind of norms applying to speech acts, maxims. Maxims can be seen as half-way between 
constitutive rules (in the sense described above) and Grice’s conversational maxims: despite 
being in some sense associated with the procedure for performing the speech act, they are not 
conventional, but are based on rational motivations, just like Grice’s conversational maxims. 
9  By ‘successfully’ I mean here that there is no misfire (in the Austinian sense), but there may still be an abuse of the 
procedure of asserting.
10  Since it is not a goal of this paper to determine the precise content of these constitutive rules, I will remain 
neutral on how their content should be articulated. 
11  As pointed out by a reviewer, even if it is true that there is no single conventional effect to be associated with 
conversations as such, we can still conceive of conversations as sequences of speech acts having some aim or other 
(such as to answer a question or settle on a plan) (see, in particular, Green, 2017). 
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Indeed, according to Sbisà (2017, p. 4), both maxims applying to speech acts and conversational 
maxims can be characterized as advice that must be followed in the attempt to optimize one’s 
communicative behavior. In particular, compliance with these maxims should lead to the 
performance of “a speech act optimally satisfactory in the perspective of the participants” 
(Sbisà, 2017, p. 15). In the case of such an “optimal” assertion, maxims require that the speaker 
should (at least) believe that what she has asserted is true, and that her subsequent behavior 
(be this verbal or non-verbal) is consistent with it. As said above, although these maxims are 
associated with the procedure for performing the speech act, and thus we normally expect 
from a speaker making an assertion that she will be sincere and consistent in her subsequent 
behavior, their violation does not lead to questioning the assertion’s successfulness, at least 
insofar as its constitutive rules are respected. As in the case of the violation of a conversational 
maxim, here too, if the speaker turns out not to be complying with one of the maxims, she will 
be blamed for this (with a resulting loss of credibility or reliability), but these consequences 
have no impact on the act being performed. For example, when someone lies by asserting that 
p, the act being performed is still recognized as an assertion: what may happen is that, if she 
is recognized as not believing what she has asserted to be true, her assertion is taken to be 
insincere and therefore subject to criticism. We can say that the speaker has made a successful 
assertion, which is however not an optimal one; that is to say, it does not amount to an optimal 
speech act performance from the perspective of the participants in the conversation (which 
would require full cooperativity).
We can now return to Cappelen and to his argument concerning modal judgments about 
norm variability. Remember that this argument aims to show that, contrary to Williamson’s 
claim, according to which assertion does not exist without being governed by (KNA), because 
that rule necessarily governs any instance of this speech act, we can conceive of cases in 
which, regardless of which of the norms mentioned in Section 3 above is in force, one can 
recognize that by saying p a speaker has performed an act corresponding to what normative 
theorists would take to be an assertion. But the three norms to which Cappelen refers 
highlight aspects that are actually involved in the making of an assertion, i.e., when taking an 
utterance to be an assertion, we normally expect that the asserter believes what she asserts, 
that she is committed to defending the asserted content if appropriately challenged, and that 
the asserted content is true. That is why at first sight one might be convinced by Cappelen’s 
argument that each of the norms considered can be regarded as an equally plausible 
candidate for the norm of assertion. But this conclusion does not hold. As our Austin-inspired 
perspective makes clear, mere compliance with any of those rules, taken individually, does 
not suffice to outline the complete procedure of asserting, to which they all in fact contribute. 
Moreover, even compliance with them all fails to put the speaker in a position to successfully 
make an assertion, since none of them makes any reference to the speaker’s epistemic 
authority with respect to the content she purports to assert. 
In this paper, I have argued that, contrary to Cappelen’s No-assertion view, some norms can be 
seen as applying to assertion in a more intimate way than others, because of the role they play 
in what Sbisà has called “the dynamics of illocution”. Among these norms, while constitutive 
rules are those the observance of which makes assertion possible, the compliance with maxims 
makes the performed assertion optimally satisfactory in the perspective of the participants 
in the conversation. As I have tried to show, distinguishing between these two kinds of norms 
can help us to account for specific defects pertaining to the making of an assertion, which, 
contrary to what is claimed by Cappelen, reliance on Grice’s conversational maxims alone 
does not seem able to do. Clearly, I have only laid the basis here for a deeper analysis of the 
role that different kinds of norms may play in the making of assertions. Many issues still 
5. Concluding 
Remarks
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need to be tackled, such as the relationship between the maxims involved in the dynamics of 
illocution and Grice’s conversational ones, particularly with reference to the maxim of quality, 
which appears to have a special relationship with the making of assertions (see, e.g., Goldberg, 
2015). For the moment, however, I hope to have shown that, thanks to the Austin-inspired 
framework presented above, we can still conceive of assertion as a category to be accounted 
for in speech act-theoretical terms.
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